Look again at that list above. The Browns took Couch first overall. The Raiders took Russell first overall. The Lions chose Harrington with the third overall choice. None were particularly controversial choices at the time.

But what if the Browns had passed on Couch in 2002, and taken McNabb, who instead went second to Philadelphia? Might Cleveland have had averaged closer to 10.3 wins for the decade, as the Eagles did, rather than 5.7? Five years later, the Browns took Brady Quinn at No. 22 overall, passing on Kevin Kolb. The Eagles picked Kolb at No. 36. Kolb is now McNabb's promising successor. Quinn has already been dumped, and is backing up in Denver.

"It's easy to say you need a quarterback," Herock says. "But you can go and on with the high picks that didn't produce. Hey, JaMarcus Russell, he was going to bring back the glory days of the Raiders. And what happens? It puts you in a bigger hole. You try for two or three or four years, and then you dump them. And then you haven't won. And then you have to start over again."

Worse yet, the current NFL financial system is such that the highest picks cost exorbitant amounts of money. So if they bust, your salary cap does too. (Although that might be remedied in the next collective bargaining agreement.)

So aren't other positions important?

Sure, if to a lesser degree.

And the Lions, Browns and Raiders have made disastrous drafting decisions about those other spots too. In 2000 and 2001, the Browns took defensive linemen Courtney Brown and Gerald Warren first and third overall, respectively. Both proved to be decent, but hardly All-Pros. In 2002, then-coach Butch Davis passed over his own former University of Miami running back Clinton Portis to take William Green. The Lions? Mostly under the stewardship of Matt Millen, they kept picking receivers in the top 10, with 2003 No. 2 overall choice Charles Rogers and 2005 No. 10 overall choice Mike Williams proving to be monumental mistakes. The Raiders' recent draft work has been riddled with errors, with cornerback Nmandi Asomugha (No. 31 overall in 2003) a rare exception. When you're picking No. 2 overall, as the Raiders did in 2004, you must do better than a so-so guard such as Robert Gallery, who failed to make an impact at his original, more important tackle position.

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Compare that with the Colts, under the direction of Bill Polian.

Their top four picks in 2000 all would play at least 73 NFL games. And, just about every year thereafter, they found stars at the bottom of the first round - after teams like the Lions, Browns and Raiders had whiffed - and several gems much latter.

In 2001, they got receiver Reggie Wayne at No. 30 and guard Ryan Diem at No. 118. In 2002, they got defensive end Dwight Freeney at No. 11 and linebacker David Thornton at No. 106. In 2003, they got tight end Dallas Clark at No. 24, defensive end Robert Mathis at No. 138 and linebacker Cato June at No. 198. In 2004, they got safety Bob Sanders at No. 44. In 2005, they got cornerbacks Marlin Jackson and Kelvin Hayden at No. 29. In 2006, they got running back Joseph Addai at No. 30 and safety Antoine Bethea at No. 207. In 2007, they got receiver Anthony Gonzalez at No. 32, left tackle Tony Ugoh at No. 42 and linebacker Clint Session at No. 136. In 2008, they got receiver Pierre Garcon at No. 205, and in 2009 they got receiver Austin Collie at No. 127.

All contributed to keeping the Colts rolling.

Of course, Manning remained the conductor, which gets back to Herock's point about quarterback comfort allowing a franchise to concentrate all efforts in other areas.

"Manning is creating the receivers," Herock says.

With that said, Polian has built other areas of the team to complement him, and give him the best chance to excel. He's been every bit as good at his job as Manning has been at his. The Patriots, Eagles and Steelers proved adept at plugging holes in the draft during the past decade, which has allowed them to let older, more expensive players leave, and create a manageable salary structure.

Sundquist agrees with Herock that "on the football side of things, quarterback stability is the most important thing, not only production on the field but leadership off the field."

But there's also something else: leadership inside an organization to create an identity.

Sundquist, now the player personnel director for the UFL's Omaha Nighthawks, believes that's the single greatest element lacking in many NFL operations.

"I think it's the organization knowing who and what it is," Sundquist says. "You look at teams that have struggled to be successful, they don't know who they are, they don't know who they want to be. And I know that's kind of a crazy statement, but that goes with ownership as well as front office leadership and down to coaching. That said, it kind of flies in my face at the moment that over the past few years, our game is about players. But to be honest with you, with stability in that area, it gives a sense of 'We don't have to be in the forefront, it's not about us, it's about everything we can do to maximize the performance of our players.' When I look at Pittsburgh, the Rooneys, they know who they are. For the longest time in Denver, we knew who we were. We knew how we did business, how to communicate in the building, everything."

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The Broncos were sixth in average wins in the past decade, with 9.3, though they have undergone a significant overhaul of late.

"New England is the same way," Sundquist says of an organizational identity. "Not everybody does it the same way, but on the other end, it comes out the same way."

The Broncos would study the other quality organizations from a contractual standpoint, to see how they were doling out dollars. But when it came time to draft, they knew what they needed, because they knew their own identity. And they didn't care what other teams thought. Olandis Gary might not have been an interesting running back to others, but to the one-cut Broncos, he fit well. Ben Hamilton might have been too light to play offensive line for others, but not in Denver.

"People forget that the Colts were really bad one year, and hit rock-bottom, and that allowed them to get that guy," Sundquist says. "So you have to take advantage of a bad situation, and have a good plan, and all the stars have to align and you have to little bit of luck. But you can quickly dig yourself out of your hole by selecting a guy who can be a pillar of your franchise for a long period of time."

And you can bury any notion of parity.

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